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A Trade Policy Perspective On Import Quotas And The Substitution Effect 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on the necessary conditions required 
in order to exploit the substitution effect which arises 
when there is a shift in demand induced by import quotas 
under imperfect competition. The protective policy 
succeeds if the substitution effect shifts in favor of 
goods produced by the domestic industry and this shift 
offsets foreign firms quota rents and the decrease in 
consumer welfare. While extant literature tends to focus 
on welfare loss associated with import quotas, in this 
paper social welfare analytics are produced and a trade 
policy decision rule for net welfare gain is obtained. 
Keywords: Import quota, social welfare, substitution effect, trade 
policy decision rule. 
JEL Classification: F13 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  One of the most salient characteristics of an import quota is that 
it is a restriction on quantity and not a restriction on price. Hence the 
profit maximizing manufacturer would want to exploit maximal revenue 
opportunities within the framework of quantity restrictions. Feenstra 
(1988) and Morke & Tarr (1984) have shown that the imposition of a quota--
in this case a voluntary export restraint (VER)--led Japanese automobile 
manufacturers to export higher quality cars at higher prices in order to 
offset the forgone profits incurred from the imposition of VER1. Hence the 
advent of a quota shifts the demand curve in favor of the relatively more 
affluent consumer and thus forces the displaced consumer to seek 
substitutes for those cars which are no longer available. This 
substitution can take the form of other imports or domestic automobiles 
                         
1"...A major puzzle for the political economy of trade policy is to 
explain why such a seemingly self-punishing policy should have become the 
protectionist measure of choice in the last two decades...", Helpman & 
Krugman (1989), pg 14. 
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which are competitively priced vis-a-vis the pre-quota restriction on 
imports. This paper focuses on the impact on of an import quota on 
domestic sales2. Even though the abstract model is applicable to import 
quotas in general, we use the applied setting of the pre-GATT 1994 U.S. 
automobile industry because it is the largest manufacturing sector in the 
U.S.. It assumes that a car is a durable good that is long lived. As a 
result relationship(s) exist between the market for new and used versions 
of the good. For example, the price that a car dealer gets depends not 
only on the current stock of new cars but also on consumer expectations 
about future stocks and their ability to trade in the secondary or used 
car market. However, an automobile also depreciates and this leads to the 
need for new replacement. A domestically made car is assumed to be 
substituted for a foreign car in each case.  
 Another impact of VERs would cause some consumers to purchase an 
automobile and hold it for a short period knowing that it could be resold 
in the used car market at anytime thereafter. The consumer stands to gain 
a premium if the real resale value is higher than the value of the car net 
of depreciation. Other consumers may postpone their consumption (purchase) 
of a new car and under extenuating circumstances they would elect to buy a 
"good used car" during the transition period between getting rid of the 
"old car" and the purchase of the new one. This scenario could be viewed 
as an intertemporal effect of smoothing consumption of a durable good  - 
new cars. That is, a new car is bought and it begins to depreciate in 
market value since it cannot be stored3. The moment that the consumer 
decides to get a new car, if consumption is postponed because the de facto 
rationing of previously available cars "prices out" the consumer, then 
from that moment on the consumer is forced to drive a vehicle that he/she 
wants to replace but is liquidity constrained to keep. In that case, the 
                         
2 A recent paper by Raff and Wagner (2009) examined the impact of import 
penetration on an oligopoly, and found that in the short run the more 
efficient firms remain competitive. However, in their model these effects 
disappear in the long run. In the oligopolistic model of Berry, et al. 
(1999) consumers tend to suffer welfare losses with volunteer export 
restraints. 
3 Assume that this is not a collector's item or a vintage automobile that 
appreciates in value during the storage period. 
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effect is the same as buying a "good used car" until a new one can be 
bought. This stylized model will result in welfare and deadweight loss 
since other things being equal, the consumer is now at a lower demand 
curve and derives less utility from the old (used) car. 
 Section II discusses the model and assumptions. It is essentially a 
neoclassical model of imperfect competition, and partial equilibrium 
between firm and consumer. Fairly standard parametrization and 
approximation procedures are used to derive an estimate of the 
substitution effect. Section III analyzes the welfare effects of the 
import quota and derives a necessary condition for a naive policy maker's 
belief that an import quota would be welfare improving or at least welfare 
neutral. Section IV is the summary and it highlights issues for 
consideration in empirical implementation of the results in this paper. 
Details about parametrization and deduction of equations are contained in 
the Appendix. 
II. THE MODEL 
 The model is based on "symmetric substitution"4. It is a somewhat 
neoclassical model that uses the convexity of indifference contours over 
brands (domestic and foreign) to consumer preference for variety. It is 
assumed that high quality firms allocate more resources to quality control 
vis-a-vis low quality firms. Thus a smaller variance and greater average 
quality implies a higher marginal cost. The production of more units would 
lead to diminishing returns to investment in quality control beyond some 
point since economies of scale mitigate against the competitive firm's 
ability to provide more goods, other things being equal. 
 Consumer beliefs about quality will be based on imperfect 
information to some extent since advertising, sampling costs and "word-of-
mouth" communications would introduce a certain element of uncertainty in 
the model. These sources of randomness in quality have led automobile 
manufacturers to offer more comprehensive warranties and consumer 
incentives to in effect signal quality. We assume that manufacturers are 
                         
4 See Krouse (1990), pp 165. 
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faced with a self enforcing mechanism of firm reputation so that they will 
not knowingly palm off low quality goods at a high price5. We assume that 
products can differ only along a single quality dimension and that at a 
given price all consumers prefer more quality to less. That is, consumers 
are non-satiated in quality. It is assumed everywhere that the good in 
question is an automobile. 
Goods characteristics 
Consider a good, j, that is comprised of a characteristic vector zj = (zj1 
zj2,...,zjN). Here zjn is the amount of characteristic n in good j, 
n=1,2,...,N. Let j be a design parameter such that changes in j results 
in changes in zj. Hence zjn(j) reflects the impact of a design change in 
good j on characteristic n. We assume that z = z'() > 0 
6 
Consumer market 
 Assume that consumers have quasi-convex preferences and that they 
are nonsatiated in quality. A representative consumer has an aggregate 
separable utility function7 given by: 
U(z,z0) = u






j
zj
  + z0, 0<<1  
The inequality implies that zj
's are imperfect substitutes and that more 
variety leads to higher consumer utility. z0 is a numeraire good and z is 
an N-vector of characteristics such that z = (z1,z2,...,zN). One commonly 
used parametrization is the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) form 
of the utility function,  
                         
5 See Akerlof (1970) and Leland (1979) for quality pricing with imperfect 
information. 
6This assumption is reasonable since it implies that improvements in 
design leads to higher quality or at least an enlargement of the 
characteristic set. 
7 See Dixit & Stiglitz (1977). 
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U(z,z0) = 






j
zj
  + z0, 0<<1. 
This implies that the CES between any two characteristics is given by  = 
1
1-
 and 0<<1 implies imperfect substitution between any two 
characteristics. Since 0<<1, there is declining marginal utility for each 
feature relative to all other features8. The change of variable vj = zj
 
and v = 
j
vj  suggests that v is a composite features index associated with 
the product chosen by a given consumer. 
Demand equations9 
The inverse demand function is derived from the first order conditions for 
consumer utility maximization. It utilizes constant marginal utility for 
the numeraire good and the marginal rate of substitution for 
characteristics (see Appendix I); z(.) is the quantity demanded and p(.) 
is the corresponding price; p and z are N-vectors of prices and 
characteristics, respectively (see Appendix II, Figure 1); y is the income 
associated with the numeraire good z0 (i.e y = p0z0). 
The firm 
The foreign firm is faced with the domestic demand p(z,y) 10 for its 
product , a VER, M, and a cost curve C(M,z())11. Feenstra (1988) proposed 
a class of homothetic cost functions with decreasing marginal cost for 
some characteristics when there is an increase in output. He postulated 
that the firm would find itself with unused fixed inputs when demand 
                         
8pj(.) = 
dU(.)
dzj
 = 






j
zj
 -1zj
-1, implies a declining rate in zj 
9 Note that Breshahan (1981) developed a model for consumer demand for 
quality in the automotive industry by using a slightly different scheme. 
10 Technically, the composition of characteristics of the z-vector for 
domestic and foreign cars are different due to the design parameter . 
11 See Epple (1987) for further characteristics. 
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decreases due to the VER. This indicates that the firm moves along its 
cost curve to adjust for unused input capacity. That is, it upgrades the 
cars it produces with the previously unused inputs. Here we assume that 
domestic firms are faced with similar cost and demand functions. Domestic 
firms are assumed to be competitive. 
The Substitution Effect12 
 Let z(p,y) be the demand for cars before the imposition of a quota13. 
In the advent of a quota, M , the price of cars increase from p to p' and 
the new demand z(p',y; M )14 goes down. The compensating income required to 
allow the consumer to maintain her original level of demand is given by y 
= z(p,y).(p' - p) = z(p,y)p. The amount of cars to  be substituted is 
given by: 
zs(.; M ) = z(p',y+y) - z(p,y).15                 [1] 
 
III. WELFARE EFFECTS 
 Assume that a certain fraction, 16, of the substitution effect goes 
to domestic producers. Then domestic sales increase by zs(.). In order 
for the quota to have at least a neutral effect on social welfare in the 
Bergsonian sense, the profits generated by the increase in domestic sales 
must offset the decrease in consumer surplus induced by the price increase 
                         
12 The computation of the substitution effect in this section is motivated 
by Varian (1990). 
13 p(z) is the inverse demand corresponding to z(p,y) where y is consumer 
income 
 14It is important to note that here that the policy variable, M , is a 
shift parameter for the demand curve. 
15 There is also an income effect zI = z(p',y) - z(p',y+y). However, 
this effect will not be analyzed here. 
16 We can assume that  is a function of cross elasticity of demand 
between imports and exports or perhaps more appropriately domestic goods. 
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from demand shift and the quota rents that accrue to the foreign firms as 
a result of the VER. The welfare accounting for this stylized model of a 
naive import quota policy, endogenously determines an optimal VER. 
 Let WL be the welfare loss due to the VER. The welfare loss consists 
of the decrease in consumer surplus and the quota rents that accrue to 
foreign firms. The welfare gain, WG, comprises the increase in producer 
surplus (profits). The import quota is at least welfare neutral, if WG >= 
WL.  
 Social welfare analytics will proceed along the envelope of consumer 
utility and firm profit functions (see Appendix II, Figure 2). Hence we 
assume that after firms adjust their output levels to maximize profits and 
individuals move to optimize utility, the variable parameters are the 
endogenously determined import quota, M , and its concomitant design 
parameter, .  
 Let WG
* = zs( M ,) for some optimal level of firm profit and 
consumer utility. Here  is a constant that incorporates the proportion, 
, and the constant share of profits that accrue to domestic firms. 
Similarly, let WL
* = ( M ,) M  + CS0() - CS1() 17. If we totally 
differentiate so that dWG
* >= dWL
*, we get the following: 
[d(zs( M ,))] >= d M  + M d + CS0d - CS
1
d - CS
1
M
d M            [2] 
After some manipulation this relation reduces to: 
d M
d
(
dzs
d M
 -  - 
M
 + CS1
M
) >= M  + CS
0

 - CS1

- 
dzs
d
             [3] 
Here we have a relationship between quota and design. If the quota goes up 
then we would expect the foreign firm to send relatively more lower grade 
cars since they would want to compete in the "fringe" market for lower 
                         
17The last two terms are consumer surplus before and after the import 
quota, respectively. See Appendix I for further description and derivation 
of equations in this section. 
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grade cars. This implies 
d M
d
 < 0. A welfare neutral policy would change 
the inequality in [3] to an equality. In this case we have: 
0< M  <= 
CS1

 - CS0

 + 
dzs
d

                                       [4] 
CS1
M
 >  + 
M
                                                       [5] 
The numerator in [4] suggests that the bounds on VER depends on the rate 
of change of the difference in consumer surplus relative to the design of 
foreign cars, and the domestic firm's profit and market share times the 
rate of change of substitution relative to car design. In the denominator, 
it depends on the rate of quota rent accrual to foreign firms relative to 
foreign car design. The bound intuitively suggests that if a VER is to be 
at least welfare neutral then it must not exceed the limit shown. If it 
does, then the substitution effect diminishes and domestic firms get less 
of the "residual demand" induced by the VER (see Figure 3, in Appendix) 
This in turn triggers smaller market share and profits. When this is 
compared to the welfare loss due to quota rents and decreased consumer 
surplus, there can be a net social welfare loss. The result [4] of this 
section provides a decision rule for policy. If VERs are below the upper 
bound, then domestic welfare is improving otherwise it decreases above the 
boundary.  The relation in [5] implies that the rate of change of consumer 
surplus when a VER is in effect must exceed the foreign firms price markup 
and the rate of change of this markup relative to the VER. Intuitively, 
this means that as long as consumer surplus is growing at a faster rate 
than price markup there is some welfare improvement18. 
 Perhaps a more insiduous aspect of this boundary conditions in [4] 
and [5] stems from the fact that domestic industry lobbyist can use the 
                         
18 After this paper wasw written, Berry, et al (1999) reported mixed 
results from an empirical analysis of VERs in the U.S. automobile 
industry. See also, Benjamin (1999) who summarized Berry, et al and 
emphasized the welfare loss aspects. None of those papers setforth 
conditions under which a VER could be welfare improving as is done here. 
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veil of a quota to increase the domestic price levels so that their 
heretofore overpriced cars would be priced to reflect higher domestic 
price levels. That is, a bottom up approach to automobile pricing can be 
generated here. If domestic cars are over priced then lobbyist can invoke 
a quota on foreign competetion to make the domestic price level come up to 
par with the over priced car. In a non-distorted economy, the burden would 
be put on the domestic producer to produce lower priced cars in order to 
be competitive. The assumptions and inferences derived thus far can be 
formally stated as follows: 
PROPOSITION: Let X(z()) be a composite good with an N-vector of 
characteristic features z(), where  is a design parameter. Define CS 
as the rate of change of the difference in consumer surplus relative to 
the design parameter. Let  be the mark-up of the price of X over marginal 
cost. Xs is the amount of X that is substituted when the price of X 
changes. Assume that there are imperfect substitutes for X available in 
the domestic market. If an import quota M  is chosen such that 0< M  <= 
CS + 
dXs
d

 and CS1
M
 >  + 
M
 where  is a proportionality constant, 
and  is the rate of change of  quota rent accrued to foreign firms, then 
there is a net social welfare gain WN = WG
* - WL
* 19provided the following 
necessary conditions20 exist: 
(i) Consumers have quasi-convex preferences and are non-satiated in 
quality, 
(ii) Foreign supply of competing goods are totally elastic over the import 
horizon, 
(iii) Domestic and foreign firms have neoclassical cost and production 
functions.            
IV. SUMMARY 
                         
19 See prior definition of W*. 
20 It may be possible to prove this proposition under more general and 
rigrous conditions. 
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 This paper presented a stylized model of naive protectionist policy 
in the form of an import quota. Many policy makers argue that domestic 
social welfare would be improved if import quotas are imposed on those 
goods for which domestic goods are at a competitive disadvantage. A 
necessary condition for this policy to be effective was determined and it 
was found to be intuitively appealing. However, the result may not be very 
stable since it depends on an unobservable substitution effect. A more 
comprehensive treatment of the topics in this paper would entail a more 
detailed development of the market structure in which this trade policy is 
to be implemented. Helpman & Krugman (1989) have shown that when this is 
done the results can be ambiguous. 
 Empirical implementation of the ideas expressed in this paper should 
be mindful of the pitfalls inherent in hedonic regressions which may be 
used to estimate demand equations (see Anderson (1985), Atkinson & 
Halvorsen (1984), Blackley, et al (1984), Epple (1987)). Bresnahan (1981) 
outlined an alternative procedure relative to "pure" hedonic regressions. 
Estimation of the substitution effect proceeds by estimating the price-
quality relationship for Japanese cars and US made cars with and without 
the VER. The "competing models" equation should show that the parameter 
estimates for the coefficients of the Japanese price-quality relationship 
are uniformly lower than those for domestic substitutes21. The difference 
between an estimate of demand for Japanese cars without a VER and an 
estimate for Japanese cars with VER would estimate the substitution 
effect. One would intuitively expect to see an upward shift of the price-
quality relation after the VER is imposed. If this is bourne out then 
there would be strong evidence in favor of the well know result that 
quality is not invariant across markets when VERs are imposed. If the 
results of the empirical procedures are promising then the model could be 
applied to a full range of products in order to estimate the total impact 
on social welfare in the macro-economy. 
                         
21 According to theory, these coefficients represent the marginal prices of the 
corresponding quality variables under an appropriate specification. If Japanese 
firms offer similar or more features than domestic firms and the price of their 
product is less, then one would expect the marginal price of features to be 
less. 
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APPENDIX I 
Consumer equations 
Let U(z,z0) = 






j
zj
  + z0, 0<<1, 0<<1. 
In equilibrium, MRS = 
dU(.)
dzi
dU(.)
dz0
 = 
pj
p0
, p0 = 1 and 
dU(.)
dz0
 is normalized to unity. 
pj = 
dU(.)
dzi
 = u'(.)zj
-1
                                   [1] 
Let vj = zj
1 and v = 
j
vj so that U(z,z0) = u(v) + z0 
From [1], pjzj = (U'(.)zj
-1)zj =  u'(.)zj
 = (v)vj      [2] 
p(z) = 
j
pjzj = 
j
 (v)vj                                   [3] 
Equation [1] describes the marginal rate of substitution between a given 
characteristic and the numeraire good in consumer equilibrium. Equation 
[3] is the inverse demand function for quality in imported goods. It is a 
hedonic price index comprised of the incremental amount of income ([2]) 
which comsumers may want to spend for additional features. In [2], (v) is 
the demand for characteristics. 
Firm equations 
The foreign firm faces a pre-VER demand p(z(),y) and a cost curve ,C(.), 
such that CM > 0, and CMM > 0. The firm's problem is as follows: 
max (.) = p(z(),y)M - C(M,z())  
     s.t M <= M  22 
                         
22 This is the import quota constraint equation. 
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The first order conditions for profit maximization leads to the following 
equations23: 
pz(z,y; M ) = 
Cz( M ,z())
M
                                  [4] 
p(z(),y; M ) = CM( M ,z()) +                             [5] 
where  is the quota rent for foreign firms or the markup of price over 
marginal cost. The corresponding equations for domestic firms replace the 
VER, M , with, Md;  with d and the domestic design parameter d replaces 
. 
 
Welfare equations 
WL =  M  + (CS(p(z,y) - CS(p(z,y; M ))                          [6] 
The first term on the right of [6] is the quota rents that accrue to 
foreign firms. The second term is the decrease in consumer surplus24. 
WG = z
s(.; M )(p(z(d),y;Md) - CMd(Md,z(d)) = z
s(.; M )d   [7] 
The first term on the right of [7] represents the amount of automobiles 
that will be purchased from domestic industries due to the substitution 
effect. The second term (enclosed in brackets) represents the rent that 
accrue to the domestic firm as a result of the increase in demand. We 
assume that firms are identical without loss of generality so that each 
firm gets an equal share of the rent in equilibrium. WL
* and WG
* 
correspond to optimal values of p(z*()), y* and C(M,z*()) and describe 
the post optimality welfare locus shown in Appendix II, Figure 2.  
                         
23 See Feenstra (1988), pp 133 
24 Consumer surplus, CS(), can be expressed as a function of price or 
quantity. This is a direct extension of the Hurwicz-Uzawa (1971) Indirect 
Utility function theorem. 
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dWG
* = dWL
* implies: 
d M
d
 = 
M  + CS
0

 - CS1

- 
dzs
d

dzs
d M
 -  - 
M
 + CS1
M
 = 
( M ,)
( M ,)
         
[8] 
Here, (.) and (.) are the numerator and denominator of [8]. If 
d M
d
 <= 0, 
then (i) either  <= 0 and  > 0 or (ii)  >= 0 and  < 0. 
Case (i): 
 <= 0 implies: 0< M  <= 
CS1

 - CS0

 + 
dzs
d

                           [9] 
 > 0 implies: 
dzs
d M
 -  - 
M
 + CS1
M
 > 0 => CS1
M
 >  + 
M
         
[10] 
The relation in [10] holds because  > 0 and 
dzs
d M
 < 0 25. 
Case (ii): 
In this case the inequalities in [9] and [10] are reversed. The reversal 
of [9] implies no quota and corresponds to free trade. In Figure 3, 
Appendix II, this corresponds to m  = 0 and domestic firms will be forced 
to charge a price pw in order to be competitive. 
 
                         
25 The substitution effect decreases as the quota increases. 
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APPENDIX II 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Modern International Economics, Ethier, Wilfred J., pp 185. 
Figure 1 shows the demand shift induced by the VER, M . US' is the demand 
curve for higher quality cars. US is the pre-VER demand curve, ostensibly 
for lower quality cars. The supply curve is flat over the region where 
Japanese firms can supply cars at a constant price as long as capacity 
permits. The quota rent that accrue to Japanese firms as a result of the 
VER is given by the area pEBp'. The decrease in consumer surplus is the 
area bounded by pp' and the US demand curve. 
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SOURCE: Adapted from Trade Policy and Market Structure, Elhanan Helpman & Paul Krugman, pg 31 
The diagram shows the residual demand D' that is induced by the import 
quota m . The free trade or pre-quota price is given by Pw. For prices 
below Pw the domestic demand curve switches to D. If policy makers know 
the slope of the residual demand curve they can accept a quota (VER) that 
lies within the defined bounds. Domestic firms are free to maximize 
profits over the residual demand curve D'. The profit maximizing firm will 
choose to produce Mq. 
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